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REQUIREMENT AND OUTPUT CONTRACTS
JuLIus J. GWYN*
A contract for the future delivery of a definite quantity
of goods at a definite price is subject to the risk of unfavor-
able market trends. The parties accept the risk as a nor-
mal hazard of business. The less definite requirement and
output contracts have made possible a redistribution of
business risk in accordance with the ability or willingness
of the parties to bear such risks. Thus, the enormous busi-
ness hazards created by severe competition, expanding
markets, and mass production have been partially neutral-
ized so that enterprise might be encouraged.
During the past quarter of a century the economic system
of the United States survived the severe test of depression
and wartime inflation. The multitude of economic press-
ures and man-made controls which accompanied these two
extremes of economic maladjustment should have focused
attention upon the weakness of any contractural obliga-
tion involving a performance in the future. Our purpose
is to determine how well requirement and output contracts
have survived the test.'
L Requirement Contracts
By the terms of the normal requirement contract the
buyer engages to purchase only the materials required in
the conduct of his business. The buyer, thus, seeks to
avoid the risks of unbalanced supply-insufficient or over-
abundant-while obviating the hazardous prediction of
sales in new or uncertain markets. The seller may be will-
ing to assume these extraordinary risks because of his de-
* 2nd year Law student, Duke University; A.B. Duke University,
1950.
1 The purpose of this article is to trace the judicial treatment of
requirement and output contracts. Harold C. Havighurst and Sidney
M. Berman, a professor and student respectively, of the Northwestern
University School of Law published an exhaustive study of the eco-
nomic factors influencing such treatment in an article entitled, Re-
quirement and Output Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1932). This 'writer
has relied heavily upon that study for a history of the developments
prior to the last two decades.
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sire to make volume sales in a highly competitive field or
because of his prior experience in the particular market.
These contracts offer opportunities to an unscrupulous
buyer to control the effect of business fluctuations at the
expense of the innocent seller. Thus, where a buyer has
engaged his requirements at a specified price, he may, dur-
ing a period of falling prices, reduce the margin of his loss
at the expense of the seller by reducing his requirements
through the use of substitutes, technical improvements, or
a decrease or cessation of business operations. Likewise,
during a period of rising prices, the unscrupulous buyer
might unreasonably expand his requirements for purpose
of taking advantage of a favorable contract.
Because of the unfavorable position of the seller and the
excessive opporunities for abuse by the buyer, some courts
hesitated to enforce the requirement contract.2 Generally,
the needs of business persuaded most courts to uphold such
contracts.8 Some courts managed to read into the contract
the implied promise of the buyer to take his normal re-
quirements,4 or to continue in business.5 Others found suf-
ficient consideration in the form of an implied promise not
to buy from anyone else.6 The doctrine of mutuality gave
some trouble where the courts interpreted it as requiring
some equivalency of obligation.7 But the majority of courts
interpreted that doctrine as requiring only an enforceable
2 Bailey v. Austrian, 19 Minn. 535 (1873); contra, Scott v. T. W.
Stevenson Co., 130 Minn. 151, 153 N.W. 316 (1915).
3 Walker Mfg. Co. v. Swift & Co., 200 Fed. 529 (5th Cir. 1912).
' Loudenbeck Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 Fed.
298 (6th Cir. 1903); National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 110
Il1. 427 (1884); Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., 160
Ill. 85, 43 N.E. 774 (1895).
1 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. H. Neuer Glass Co., 253 Fed. 161
(6th Cir. 1918); Sterling Coal Co. v. Silver Spring Bleaching &
Dyeing Co., 162 Fed. 848 (1st Cir. 1908). Also: Wells v. Alexandre,
130 N.Y. 642, 29 N.E. 142 (1891); Hickey v. O'Brien, 123 Mich. 611,
82 N.W. 241 (1900); Diamond Alkali Co. v. P. C. Tomson & Co., 35 F.2d
117 (3rd Cir. 1929).
6 Trainor v. Buchanan Coal Co., 154 Minn. 204, 191 N.W. 431 (1923);
Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp., 279 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1922).
7 Crane v. Crane & Co., 105 Fed. 869 (7th Cir. 1901); Jenkins &
Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 247 Fed. 958 (9th Cir. 1918).
182 DUKE BAR JOURNAL
counter-promise in the form of one of the implied promises
just mentioned.8
In spite of general enforcement of these contracts, the
courts strained to prevent a buyer from taking an uncon-
scionable advantage of a favorable contract or avoiding an
unfavorable one. Two methods of treating the abused or
unjust contract were devised: The first was to nullify the
contract completely under the doctrine of mutuality and
certainty; the second method involved the construc-
tion of the obligations so that only the activity of the buyer
was restricted while the contract remained enforceable.
Under the first method the contract might be held
void for uncertainty or lack of mutuality where the article
for sale was not "incident to the established business of
the buyer."9 In accordance with this rule some courts were
led to hold all jobber's contracts void for lack of mutuality
or certainty.10 Because of its inflexibility many courts re-
jected this view. 1 Likewise, the contract might be held
void for lack of mutuality or certainty where the buyer con-
tracted for the requirements of a business not yet estab-
lished,12 but this rule was also too inflexible to be strictly
followed.18
8 Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill.
102, 133 N.E. 711 (1921); Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp.,
supra note 6; Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co.,
supra note 4; Trainor v. Buchanan Coal Co., supra note 6; Zlehm v.
Frank Steil Brewing Co., 131 Md. 582, 102 Atl. 1005 (1917).
9 Crane v. Crane & Co., supra note 7.
10 Crane v. Crane & Co., supra note 7; Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim
Sugar Co., 237 Fed. 278 (S.D.Cal. 1916), reversed: 247 Fed 958 (9th Cir.
1918); Cohen v. Clayton Coal Co., 86 Colo. 270, 281 Pac. 111 (1929).
2 Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., supra note 7; Texas Co. v.
Pensacola Maritime Corp., supra note 6; Baker v. Murray Tool &
Supply Co., 137 Okla. 288, 279 Pac. 340 (1929); Trainor v. Buchanan
Coal Co., supra note 6; Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal
Co., supra note 4; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. H. Neuer Glass Co.,
supra note 5.
12 American Trading Co. v. National Fibre & Insulation Co., 31 Del.
66, 111 Atl. 290 (1920). Dicta: Klipstein & Co. v. Allen, 123 Fed. 992
(C.C.N.D.Ga. 1903); Ziehm v. Frank Steil Brewing Co., supra note 8;
Grimwood v. Munson S.S. Line, 273 Fed. 166 (2d Cir 1921); Lima
Locomotive & Machine Co. v. National Steel Castings Co., 155 Fed.
77 (6th Cir. 1907).
2 Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp., supra note 6; Baker v.
Murray Tool & Supply Co., supra note 11.
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In a proper case the court might interpret the contract
to be for the sale of such materials as the buyer might
"wish" or "want." The quantity of the sale being uncer-
tain because determined at the caprice and convenience of
the buyer, the contract might be held void and unenforce-
able.14 The court might declare an abused contract void
for lack of consideration by finding no promise, express or
implied, not to buy elsewhere. 15 Yet, where there was no
evidence of abuse on the part of the buyer, the court, by
interpretation, might find ample consideration in the form
of an implied promise not to buy from another.'
The second method emphasized construction of the
contract provisions. The contract might be declared en-
forceable, but limited in operation by implied promises read
into it. Thus, where the buyer was a non-established busi-
ness, the court declared the seller's obligation to be condi-
tional upon the business becoming established before de-
liveries were to begin.17 Where the buyer sought to "stock
up" on the materials ordered under his requirement contract,
the court read into the contract an implied obligation to
supply only actual requirements. 8 Where the require-
ments of the buyer had expanded under the pressure of
business, the courts implied an obligation to supply only
" Texarkana Casket Co. v. Binswanger & Co., 3 F.2d 611 (E.D.
Tex. 1924); Cold Blast Transportation Co. v. Kansas City Bolt & Nut
Co., 114 Fed. 77 (8th Cir. 1902); Hoffman v. Maffioli, 104 Wis. 630,
80 N.W. 1032 (1899); Northern Iowa Gas & Electric Co. v. Incorpo-
rated Town of Luverne, 257 Fed. 818 (N.D.Iowa 1919); McCaw Mfg.
Co. v. Felder, 115 Ga. 408, 41 S.E. 664 (1902).
i Schlegel Manufacturing Co. v. Cooper's Glue Factory, 231 N.Y.
459, 132 N.E. 148 (1921).
"1 Bartlett Springs Co. v. Standard Box Co., 16 Cal.App. 671, 117
Pac. 934 (1911); Lima Locomotive & Machine Co. v. National Steel
Castings Co., supra note 12; A. Santaella "& Co. v. Otto F. Lange Co.,
155 Fed. 719 (8th Cir. 1907).
17 Nassau Supply Co., Inc. v. Ice Service Co., Inc., 252 N.Y. 277, 169
N.E. 383 (1929).
28 Dowd v. Hercules Powder Co., 66 Colo. 302, 181 Pac. 767 (1919);
Asahel Wheeler Co. v. Mendleson, 180 App. Div. 9, 167 N.Y.Supp. 435
(1917); Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co.,
supra note 8; Laclede Construction Co. v. Moss Tie Co., 185 Mo. 25, 84
S.W. 76 (1904); Cullinan v. Standard Light & Power Co., 65 S.W. 689
(Tex.Civ.App. 1901); Moore v. American Molasses Co., 179 App. Div.
505, 166 N.Y.Supp. 4 (1917).
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"normal" requirements." But where the expansion was
deemed to have been within the contemplation of the par-
ties, a sympathetic court could read into the contract an
obligation to furnish all good faith requirements. 20
Similarly, in a falling market the contract provisions
have been interpreted to favor the unfortunate seller.
Thus, the buyer might be held to have obliged himself to
remain in business.21  Or he might be declared to have
obliged himself to take his normal requirements.22 Or the
court might read into the contract an obligation on the buy-
er to take all that he in good faith required.2
An examination of the more recent cases has failed to
reveal any decision holding a requirement contract unen-
forceable simply because the buyer was a jobber or a "non-
producing" business. In many cases the requirement con-
tracts of jobbers and "non-producing" businesses have been
declared valid and enforceable, and consequently, not void
for uncertainty or lack of mutuality.24 Where a coal dealer,
who consumed no coal to his own use, contracted to buy
his requirements of coal from a mine operator, the court
upheld the contract as valid although the dealer's business
was for sale at the time the contract was made.26
19 Andrews Coal Co. v. Board of Directors, 151 La. 695, 92 So. 303
(1922); Smith v. Donk Brothers Coal & Coke Co., 260 S.W. 545 (Mo.
App. 1924); Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., supra
note 4; E. G. Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., 128 Mich. 591, 87 N.W. 761
(1901); Anaheim Sugar Co. v. Jenkins & Co., 274 Fed. 504 (9th Cir.
1921).
20 New York Central Ironworks Co. v. United States Radiator Co.,
174 N.Y. 331, 66 N.E. 967 (1903).
2Diamond Alkali Co. v. P. C. Tomson & Co., supra note 5; Hickey
v. O'Brien, supra note 5.
= Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., supra note
4; Chalmers & Williams v. Bledsoe & Co., 218 fll.App. 363 (1920).
0 Cragin Products Co. v. Fitch, 6 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1925); Mc-
Keever, Cook & Co., v. Canansburg Iron Co., 138 Pa. 184, 20 Atl. 938
(1890).
2" Hladik v. Noe, 214 Iowa 854, 243 N.W. 180 (1932); Great Eastern
Oil Co. v. DeMert & Dougherty, Inc., 350 Mo. 535, 166 S.W.2d 490
(1942); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Jarrett, 42 F.Supp. 723 (M.D.Ga.
1942); Joest v. John A. Denie's Sons Co., 174 Tenn. 410, 126 S.W.2d 312
(1939).
"William C. Atwater & Co. v. Terminal Coal Corp., 115 F.2d 887
(1st Cir. 1940).
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Likewise, the courts' initial distaste for the favored posi-
tion of the non-established business which contracts for its
requirements has been overcome with rare exception. In
one case where a non-established match company contracted
to buy its requirements of matches from a seller and the
seller contracted not to sell matches in competition with the
buyer, the court, in upholding the contract, said:
"We cannot see why any valid distinction should
be made where a contract is entered into between
two persons concerning the purchase of goods be-
cause of the fact that one of the parties had not
been in business before. This . . . is what is
known . . . as a 'requirement' contract and calls
for the manufacture and delivery by the [seller]
to the [buyer] of the amount of goods that it would
require and sell to its trade. '26
And, where a non-established jobber contracted to buy all
the sand which he could sell, the contract was declared en-
forceable and not void for lack of mutuality.27 A contract
for the requirements of a non-established business has been
enforced where that point was not in issue.28 On the other
hand, in the case of Pessin v. Fox Head Wankesha Corp.,2 9
where a non-established beer distibutor agreed to pur-
chase his requirements from the seller and the seller agreed
not to sell to any other distributor in the territory, the con-
tract was held to be void for lack of mutuality because the
requirements of a non-established business were too in-
definite to be enforceable, notwithstanding the fact that the
contract had been amended to require a minimum of 100
barrels per week. But this case has been severely criticised
on the grounds that the distributor's promise to sell no
other product was consideration for the seller's promise to
furnish requirements and that the price and quantity terms
prevented abuse by the buyer.30
20 Match Corporation of America v. Acme Match Corp., 285 Ill.App.
197, 202, 1 N.E.2d 867, 869 (1936).
"I McMichael v. Price, 177 Okla. 186, 58 P.2d 549 (1936).
23 Knowles Foundry & Machine Co. v. National Plate Glass Co., 301
Ill.App. 128, 21 N.E.2d 913 (1939).
230 Wis. 277, 282 N.W. 582 (1938).
Recent Cases, 52 HA&v.L.REv. 836 (1939).
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The courts apparently retain the prerogative to interpret
an unconscionable contract as one for the buyer's "wishes"
or "wants" and therefore void for uncertainty and lack of
mutuality.3' But this is not entirely satisfactory for the
result is to nullify the contract as of its inception while the
real difficulty is in determining the nature of the perform-
ance required by its terms. In order to preserve the valid-
ity of the requirement contract, yet restrict the freedom of
the buyer, the courts have continued to emphasize the con-
struction of the provisions. Where a buyer purchased a
going business and agreed ". . . to purchase and pay for
within one year . . . all of . . . said stock of parts which
can reasonably be used" by the buyer, the court declared
the provision to create a definite and certain obligation and
that it was not restricted to the parts which the buyer
could actually use.32
It appears to be settled that courts which hold require-
ment contracts valid, no longer find an implied obligation
on the part of the buyer to stay in business so as to continue
to have requirements. In the case of In re United Cigar
Stores Co. of America,88 the buyer contracted to buy from
the seller ". . . all the ice cream . . . required for its
stores." When the buyer ended its business in voluntary
bankruptcy, the court ruled that the buyer's conduct did
not constitute a breach of the contract for there was no im-
plied obligation to have requirements. The court reasoned
that the buyer should be free to deal with its own business
as it sees fit so long as its conduct is bona fide. Again, in
William C. Atwater & Co. v. Terminal Coal Corp.,84 a coal
dealer contracted to buy his requirements of coal not to ex-
ceed a certain maximum. When the dealer sold his busi-
ness and thus ended his requirements before the end of the
term, the court found no implied obligation upon the dealer
1 G. Loewus & Co. v. Vischia, 2 N.J. 54, 65 A.2d 604 (1949); Master
Contracting Corp. v. M. F. Hickey Co., 275 App.Div. 860, 89 N.Y.S.2d
265 (1949), reversing 87 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1949).
m Whiting Stoker Co. v. Chicago Stoker Corp., 171 F.2d 248, 249
(7th Cir. 1948).
3 72 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1934).
" Supra note 25.
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to stay in business under the circumstances. The business
had been up for sale at the time the contract was made. The
buyer in Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp.5 contracted to buy seventy-five per
cent of its requirements from the seller. The contract was
to continue until written notice of annulment was given in
which case certain diminished orders would result over a
year's time after which the contract would terminate.
During prosperous years the seller advanced large sums of
money to enlarge the buyer's building wherein the seller
produced goods to satisfy the contract and the seller also
invested large sums in new machinery to be utilized in sat-
isfying the contract. When the buyer ceased to operate its
business the court found no duty upon the buyer to have
requirements so long as the buyer acted in good faith. Like-
wise. in Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland
Cement Co.,30 where the buyer reduced his requirements of
natural gas for fuel by replacing worn-out equipment with
new and more efficient equipment, the court failed to find
an implied promise to maintain normal requirements. The
only implied obligation which the court read into the con-
tract was for good faith conduct of the business. The
courts have generally abandoned the use of all implied
obligations in construing such contracts, except the obli-
gation of the buyer to purchase all of his good faith, actual
requirements.37
ITL Output Contracts
By the terms of the normal output contract, the seller
agrees to sell its entire production for the specified period.
The seller seeks an advantage through reduced cost of mar-
keting and a better division of labor, while the buyer desires
the higher rate of profit derived from lower unit cost of
materials.
© 130 F.2d 471 (3rd Cir. 1942).
102 F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1939).
In re United States Cigar Stores Co. of America, supra note 33;
Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., supra
note 36; Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass
Corp., supra note 35; Royal Paper Box Co. v. Apt Shoe Co., 290 Mass.
207, 195 N.E. 96 (1935).
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Because of an unfavorable bargaining position, the out-
put seller has been allowed more freedom than the require-
ment buyer. The courts in the earlier cases never denied
recovery to the seller on the grounds that the contract lack-
ed consideration, mutuality or certainty, although those de-
fenses were frequently urged.38 Likewise, contracts in-
volving the sale of the output of jobbers and non-established
businesses were upheld on every occasion. 0 In some in-
stances where it was evident that an output seller was de-
creasing or ceasing production to avoid an unfavorable con-
tract the court was not inclined to declare such conduct a
breach.40 A different result was reached, however, Where
the buyer had gone to large expense in reliance on the con-
tract,41 or where the seller stopped his production only for
the duration of the contract.42 If the reduced output was
a result of bona fide business considerations and not an
effort to avoid the contract, that conduct was held not to be
a breach.48 There appear to be no cases which required the
seller to maintain normal production in a rising market.
Where the seller expands production in a falling market
courts have on occasion limited the seller's freedom. In one
case the court declared a buyer not bound to purchase the
increased output resulting from the use of new equipment
* Imperial Refining Co. v. Kanotex Refining Co., 29 F.2d 193 (8th
Cir. 1928); Ramey Lumber Co. v. Schroeder Lumber Co., 237 Fed. 39
(7th Cir. 1916); Fayette-Kanawha Coal Co. v. Lake & Export Coal
Corp., 91 W.Va. 132, 112 S.E. 222 (1922); City of Marshall v. Kalman,
153 Minn. 320, 190 N.W. 597 (1922); Green v. Lovejoy, 155 Minn. 241,
193 N.W. 173 (1923); Hollandsworth v. William Meade Tie Co., 20
F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1928); McIntyre Lumber & Export Co. v. Jackson
Lumber Co., 165 Ala. 268, 51 So. 767 (1910).
19 Ramey Lumber Co. v. Schroeder Lumber Co., supra note 38; City
of Marshall v. Kalman, supra note 38; Kanaskat Lumber & Shingle
Co. v. Cascade Timber Co., 80 Wash. 561, 142 Pac. 15 (1914).
10 Pfann v. Turner Cypress Lumber Co., 194 Fed. 69 (5th Cir. 1912);
Wemple v. Stewart, 22 Barb. Ch. 154 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1856).
1 Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 222 N.Y. 272, 118 N.E.
618 (1918).
42 Dawson Cotton Oil Co. v. Kenan, McKay & Speir, 21 Ga.App. 676,
94 S.E. 1037 (1918).
4Kenan, McKay & Speir v. Yorkville Cotton Oil Co., 260 Fed. 28
(4th Cir. 1919); Dawson Cotton Oil Co. v. Kenan, McKay & Speir,
suvra note 42; Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., supra note
41; Burt v. Garden City Sand Co., 237 Ill. 473, 86 N.E. 1055 (1908).
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because the contract was to purchase the output of a mine
as it then was.44 But where the expansion was bona fide
and reasonably foreseeable the buyer was in one case held
bound to purchase the output of the seller which had in-
creased one and three-fourths times the original estimate.45
In keeping with the early favorable treatment of the out-
put seller, the courts of the last twenty years have refused
to invalidate a contract for a seller's entire output on the
grounds of a lack of mutuality, certainty or consideration.
Where the output seller sold a portion of its output to a
third party not included in the output contract and the
seller contended, in defense of a suit brought by the buyer,
that the contract was void for lack of "mutuality of obliga-
tion," the court summarily dismissed that contention by
saying that the output contract was sufficient to bind the
seller.40  Likewise, where a non-established business con-
tracted to sell its entire output up to a maximum figure, the
seller was declared to be obligated for the entire output
even though it was less than the maximum.47 And no case
appears in which a contract for the output of a jobber or
non-established business has been declared invalid because
of the uncertainty of the business.
It is interesting that no cases of the last few years have
directly presented the problem of an output seller who has
decreased or ended his output primarily to avoid an un-
favorable contract in a rising market although the rising
market has been in existence. On several occasions where
output has ceased, the court has failed to find any obliga-
tion upon the seller to stay in business. In one case, where
a city owned ice houses and agreed to ". . . sell unto the
[buyer] such quantity of ice as the city owns or shall har-
vest . . ." for a definite period, the court held that it was
" Fayette-Kanawha Coal Co. v. Lake & Export Coal Corp., supra
note 38.
"r Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 Fed. 976 (S.D.
N.Y. 1917).
,0 A. M. Webb & Co. v. Robert P. Miller Co., 157 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir.
1946); also see: Wood v. Saylor Tie & Timber Co., 6.7 S.W.2d 826
(Mo.App. 1934).
'7 Mantell v. International Plastic Harmonica Corp., 138 N.J.Eq. 562,
49 A.2d 290 (1946).
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not a breach of contract for the city to refuse to harvest
ice or to refuse to rebuild the ice houses that had burned
down during the contract term. The city was declared
obliged to sell only such ice as was actually harvested.48 A
contract for "sale of all casinghead gasoline, from 25 to 35
cars per month, which may be produced or manufactured"
during a particular year was declared not to obligate the
seller to continue to have output.4 And, where the seller
agreed to sell its output for a period of five years and it
liquidated its business during the term, the court found no
obligation upon the seller to remain in business. But the
court there implied that such an obligation might have
been found had the seller not acted upon bona fide business
judgment, when it said: "The essence of any cause of action
based on going out of business and ceasing to have require-
ments or output is bad faith.""0
m. Special Clauses
Aside from the implied obligations, other special pro-
visions regarding the quantity of goods were often written
into requirement and output contracts by the parties them-
selves. These appeared to be self-imposed limitations, but
the courts which recognized the utility of requirement and
output contracts favored the flexibility of the requirement
and output provision as more definite and certain than
the qualifying estimate.51 On one occasion the court con-
strued a contract to be for requirements where only an
approximate figure had been mentioned.5 2 Yet, approxi-
mate figures have been adopted as limits upon buyers who
were seeking to abuse favorable contracts. 8 Courts which
were careful to avoid embarrassment in future cases, how-
's Ives v. City of Willimatic, 121 Conn. 408, 410, 185 At. 427, 427
(1936).
"9 Henry H. Cross Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 284 Ill.App.
644, 2 N.E.2d 587, 587 (1936).
Duboff v. Matam Corp., 272 App. Div. 502, 503, 71 N.Y.S.2d 134,
136 (1947).
G Brawley v. United States, 96 U.S. 168 (1877).
52 Ruth-Hastings Glass Tube Co. v. Slattery, 266 Pa. 288, 109 At.
695 (1920).
3Waddell v. Phillips, 133 Md. 497, 105 At. 771 (1919).
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ever, used these figures only in support of other circum-
stances when forming a limitation. 4
Except in a few cases the courts have favored the flexible
requirements and output terms over the more explicitly
restrictive maximum-minimum provisions. On one occa-
sion the court interpreted the provision to set the absolute
limits of the obligation but declared that the buyer's re-
quirements were the measure within those limits.55  In
another, the buyer was declared to be obligated to purchase
at least the minimum amount regardless of his require-
ments.51 Usually, the terms were declared contradictory
so that only one was enforced. Thus, a buyer was held to
be entitled to his requirements even though in excess of
the stated maximum.57  Similarly, a seller who delivered
his entire output was held not to have broken his contract
even though the amount delivered fell far short of the stat-
ed minimum. s And where the clauses were in conflict the
court allowed the practical construction of the parties to
determine which should govern. 59 Other courts in similar
cases have held the maximum-minimum proyisions con-
trolling while allowing the buyer to order at his discretion
within the limits set.60
No recent case has been found in which a contract pro-
vision for an estimated or approximated quantity has been
held to predominate over the requirement provision. Many
cases have ruled the requirement provision to be the domi-
nant measure of the contract.61 Similar cases regarding
r4Andrews Coal Co. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools, 151 La.
695, 92 So. 303 (1922); Dawson Cotton Oil Co. v. Kenan, McKay &
Speir, supra note 42.
0 Louisville Soap Co. v. Taylor, 279 Fed. 470 (6th Cir. 1922).
Heisel v. Volkman, 55 App.Div. 607, 67 N.Y.Supp. 271 (1900).
07Walker Manufacturing Co. v. Swift & Co., 200 Fed. 529 (5th Cir.
1912).
Herren v. Gaines, 63 N.C. 72 (1868).
0 Bell-Wayland Co. v. Russell Jobbers' Mills, 92 Okla. 201, 218 Pac.
827 (1923).
c' Corsicana Compress Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 253 S.W. 559
(Tex.Civ.App. 1923); Diamond Alkali Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., 264
Pa. 304, 107 Atl. 711 (1919).
6 Webber v. Johnston, 214 Cal. 378, 5 P.2d 886 (1931); Royal Paper
Box Co. v. Apt Shoe Co., supra note 37; Knowles Foundry & Machine
Co. v. National Plate Glass Co., supra note 28; M. W. Kellogg Co. v.
Standard Steel Fabricating Co., 189 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1951).
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output contracts have seemed to reach the same result.
Where the contract was for the ". . . sale of all . . . gas-
oline, from 25 to 35 cars per month, which may be pro-
duced . . ." and the seller voluntarily closed its plant, the
court found an obligation on the seller to sell only that
which it actually produced.0 2 Yet, where the seller con-
tracted to sell ". . . all white oak cross-ties produced by
[seller] . . . estimated at 10,000 in number," and the buy-
er refused further deliveries after receiving approximately
3,000 ties, the court ruled that the estimate was the domi-
nant measure of the contract. The court said, "The phrase
is not indefinite or conjectural in meaning," and suggested
that the estimate was included for the purpose of approx-
imating the amount bought.63
At least one modern case involving a maximum-minimum
provision in a requirement contract was interpreted to fa-
vor the flexibility of the requirement provision. The buyer
agreed to purchase ". . . all Jetty Stone required to com-
plete the two jetties at Cape May." The contract included
the provision: "The approximate daily delivery will be
between 500 and 700 tons." The court ruled that the con-
tract was one for requirements after the seller refused to
deliver on demand. 64
Recent cases in which maximum estimates accompanied
the requirement provision were decided in favor of the
requirement provision. Where the buyer ordered a "max-
imum of 35,000 gallons" of anti-freeze and the seller re-
plied, ". . Please do not be misled into signing any other
contract as we have covered your requirements," the court
declared that a contract for requirements had been made.05
And where a coal dealer agreed to purchase his require-
ments of coal not to exceed 150,000 tons, the buyer was
declared obligated to purchase only his good faith require-
"Henry H. Cross Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., supra note 49.
Wood v. Saylor Tie & Timber Co., supra, note 46 at 829.
"Kingston Trap Rock Co. v. Eastern Engineering Co., 132 N.JL.
254, 258, 39 A.2d 422, 424 (1944).
0 Great Eastern Oil Co. v. DeMert & Dougherty, Inc., 350 Mo. 535,
166 S.W.2d 490 (1942).
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ments even though they ended short of the 150,000 tons
when the buyer sold its business.66
Conclusion
There is no longer any doubt that requirement and out-
put contracts may be enforced. The necessarily implied
promise of the output seller not to sell to anyone else, or of
the requirement buyer not to buy from anyone else, fur-
nishes all the consideration necessary for the counter-prom-
ise of the buyer or seller as the case may be.67 If the only
question involved were one of consideration, the promisor
might be left free to expand to the fullest in order to take
advantage of a favorable contract or to cease operations
entirely in order to avoid an unfavorable one. The recent
cases, however, avoid these results, not by striking down
the contracts entirely, but by reading into it a requirement
of good faith.
The proposed Uniform Commercial Code68 also treats the
problem as one of interpretation. It provides:
"A term which measures the quantity by the out-
put of the seller or the requirements of the buyer
means such actual output or requirements as may
occur in good faith, except that no quantity un-
reasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate
or in the absence of any stated estimate to any
normal or otherwise comparable prior output or
requirements may be tendered or demanded."
By and large this appears to be an effort to codify the prevail-
ing case law.69 It would require even good faith perform-
el Supra note 25.
01 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, §§ 156, 158 (1950).
§ 2-306 (1) as revised Sept. 1950.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-306 (1), Comment 1 (Spring 1950).
" . .[This section) applies to . . .contracts of nonproducing
establishments such as dealers or distributors as well as to
manufacturing concerns."
§ 2-306 (e), Comment 2 (Spring 1950).
"... Reasonable elasticity in the requirements is expressly
envisaged by this section and good faith variations from prior
requirements are permitted even when the variation may be
such as to result in discontinuance. A shutdown to curtail
losses, however, is not permissible ... but a shutdown for
lack of orders might be permissible . . ."
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ance to be restricted to the reasonable contemplation of the
parties as of the making of the contract.70 A departure
from the general trend of case law is more evident in the
treatment of approximations in the contract. While the
courts have tended to favor the flexibility of the require-
ment or output provision, the Code would allow estimates
and approximations to control.71 What constitutes an un-
reasonably disproportionate quantity appears to be a ques-
tion of fact to be determined in the light of existing circum-
stances.
It is submitted that the good faith rule as proposed by
the Uniform Commercial Code offers a sound practical ap-
proach to the problem. Such a rule allows reasonable ex-
pansion and contraction according to business demands,
while protecting a party in an unfavorable bargaining po-
sition from the caprice of the other.
- Ibid. § 2-306 (1), Comment 2 (Spring 1950).
S... [T]he party who will determine quantity is required
to ... conduct his business in good faith ... so that his
output or requirements will approximate a reasonably foresee-
able figure."
- Ibid. § 2-306 (1), Comment 3 (Spring 1950).
.. . Any minimum or maximum set by the agreement shows
a clear limit on the intended elasticity. In similar fashion,
the agreed estimate is to be regarded as a center around
which the parties intend the variation to occur."
